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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

10 August 1984

LIBERIA: CRITICAL TIMES FOR THE MILITARY [REDACTED]

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Summary

The coup led in 1980 by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe thrust the ill-prepared military establishment into the role of governing Liberia for the first time since freed American slaves founded the country 133 years earlier. The regime's self-proclaimed goals have been to eradicate the vestiges of domination by the Americo-Liberian elite, revive the economy hobbled by worldwide recession and government mismanagement, and to restore the country to civilian rule by 1986. [REDACTED]

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Four years of military rule have done little to lay a firm foundation for the return to civilian rule. Doe's decision to lift the lid on political activity comes at a time of continuing economic hardship for most Liberians, and uncertainty over what lies at the end of the transition period. Doe's erratic behavior and indecision over his role during and after the transition--now apparently resolved in favor of his running for president--have added to the political confusion. [REDACTED]

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This memorandum was prepared by [REDACTED] West Africa Branch, Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, [REDACTED]

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We believe the unity of Liberia's military will be severely strained as it attempts to monitor and control the transition process and protect its economic and political interests. In our judgment, the military--divided along ethnic lines and split over its political role and future--is poorly equipped to play the role of a stabilizing force during the next 18 months. Moreover, we expect these divisions to become sharper as political activity picks up pace. [REDACTED]

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Liberia's military will remain political center stage throughout the transition and ultimately will determine the success or failure of the transition. While impossible to predict with certainty, the present weight of evidence suggests that the military may hold together, and permit a civilian government--most likely headed by Doe--to take power. The situation, however, is fragile and volatile and we cannot discount the possibility of a coup that at the very least would delay the return to civilian rule. [REDACTED]

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Whatever role the military takes in the next 18 months is likely to influence US-Liberian relations. The military's dependence on the US for training and materiel, along with important bilateral communications and access agreements, will continue to make the status of the Armed Forces of Liberia an issue central to relations between Monrovia and Washington. [REDACTED]

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In our judgment, Liberia's military will have difficulty carrying out its self-appointed roles as final arbiter of political disputes and the guarantor of public order during what is likely to be a rocky transition to civilian rule. After four years in power, the military remains divided along ethnic lines, confused about its role in transition, and uncertain of its place in any future civilian government. Moreover, the inability of the military to improve its military capabilities or significantly better the living conditions for soldiers during its tenure in power has further undermined its ability to provide a politically stabilizing hand. [REDACTED]

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Profile of the Liberian Armed Forces

[REDACTED] that during the long years of rule by the Americo-Liberian elite, the military was deliberately kept small, poorly equipped, and politically corrupted. From its creation in 1904 as the Liberian Frontier Force until recently, the Army's functions

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[redacted]

were limited to frontier defense, internal security, and occasional international deployments such as the UN peacekeeping operation in the early 1960s in Zaire. [redacted]

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The April 1980 coup came against the backdrop of the long exclusion of Liberia's tribal majority from political and economic power, and the lack of political and social reform following the 1979 rice riots in Monrovia. Although many rural Liberian tribesmen, particularly the Lomas, saw a military career as a way of getting ahead, lucrative senior officer positions traditionally had remained the preserve of the coastal settler aristocracy and its coopted tribal allies. [redacted]

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The coup transformed the military overnight into the country's single most important political institution. While US Embassy reporting amply documents that Head of State Doe is in effect a one-man government, the military has been drawn into all levels of government, including 22 soldiers who sit on the newly created 58-member Interim National Assembly. In addition, Doe is assisted by a cabinet all of whose civilian members hold military commissions and are subject to military discipline. In addition, military officers also participate in the management of parastatal corporations, county government, and the judiciary. [redacted]

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In our judgment, the army's political activism has undermined its already suspect ability to carry out its military mission. [redacted]

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[redacted] Virtually all equipment is US-made but poorly maintained. The concentration of troops in the Monrovia area--three of six infantry battalions and most support units, for example, are deployed in or near the capital--leaves the hinterland areas only thinly garrisoned. (See Table 1) [redacted]

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Nor do the Liberian Armed Forces constitute a strongly nationalistic or cohesive force. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Loyalties are rooted in tribe, rather than profession or class, and support for commanders from other tribes is tenuous at best. [redacted]

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We believe the Army probably is capable of handling occasional small scale civil disturbances, but that it would be hardpressed to respond quickly and effectively if called on to put down repeated or widespread demonstrations. Moreover, sources of the US Embassy doubt that troops would be willing to fire at civilians should violent demonstrations

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occur. Most soldiers, for example, joined in the rioting and looting in Monrovia in 1979 after the government threatened to hike the price of rice. [REDACTED]

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Divisive Issues

Liberia's military enters the transition period divided. In our judgment, whoever governs will have no choice but to spend a large portion of Liberia's scarce resources on trying to balance diverse political and ethnic interests in the military and to meet its most basic economic needs. However, in our judgment, there is little likelihood that any government will be able to placate or control all factions within the military, or take the loyalty of the military for granted. [REDACTED]

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Ethnic Rivalries. Although the US Embassy reports that many Liberians take enormous satisfaction in having a "country person" in charge for the first time, the military is still plagued by intense ethnic rivalries. In the view of many tribesmen, Doe's "revolution" has replaced the traditional elitist domination of Liberia and its military with that of his fellow Krahn. Lomas--who along with Kpelles from northwestern Liberia accounted for perhaps three-fourths of all enlisted men prior to 1980--are still the largest group in uniform, but see their dominance being gradually diluted by the increasing numbers of recruits from southeastern Liberia, particularly Krahn and Kru. Several hundred Krahn and Kru tribesmen have been brought into the Army since early 1983 despite an official ban on new recruitment intended to hold down payroll costs. Moreover, Kru and Krahn are disproportionately represented in the officer corps, particularly in the higher ranks, based on their presumed loyalty to Doe rather than their military qualifications. (See Table 2) [REDACTED]

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Doe is well aware of the impact of tribalism, but appears to believe that he has no political choice but to rely on his kinsmen. Since coming to power, Doe has nipped in the bud at least 14 alleged military plots motivated at least in part by personal and tribal grievances. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In addition, Doe is protected by a special bodyguard, largely Krahn, whose members are personally selected by him for demonstrated loyalty. [REDACTED]

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Bread and Butter Issues. Although the military is still far better off than most civilians, the general decline of the economy has affected the armed forces members at all levels, particularly enlisted men. Paychecks are generally two months late [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Moreover, inflation, food shortages, and rising civilian

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[redacted]

unemployment all add to the drain on soldiers' paychecks from the sizeable number of extended family members who depend upon them. Deductions for government development projects in their home districts further erode soldiers' income. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] For example, troops concentrated in and around Monrovia were barely able to carry out orders to deploy to the border during a temporary spat with Sierra Leone in 1983, arriving largely in rented vehicles and carrying unserviceable weapons. At times, the Army has difficulty in providing even such basic necessities as uniforms and food. [redacted]

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There also is disillusionment in the ranks with what is seen as the widespread corruption of senior officers. Doe himself is not immune from from criticism, partly because of his tolerance for the corrupt activities of his military colleagues. [redacted]

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Attitudes toward a Return to Civilian Rule. [redacted]

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[redacted] the military is anxious and uncertain about the country's scheduled return to civilian rule and split over the type of government best suited for Liberia. [redacted]

[redacted] many in the military doubt that a civilian regime would be able to manage effectively the country's economic and political problems. On the other hand, Defense Minister Allison and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Dubar, [redacted] believe the military would best be served by returning to the barracks and letting civilians shoulder the burden of administration and take the blame for a failing economy. The US Defense Attache points out that all ranks fear possible retribution for misdeeds committed since 1980 and that budget cuts by a civilian government would make their economic situation even worse. [redacted]

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We believe the appearance of widespread support for leftist parties would pose a particularly delicate problem for the military. Although a majority of the military reportedly is opposed to the election of a leftist, civilian government, such an event probably would provoke fierce debate in all ranks. In particular, there likely would be strong pressures within the military to step in, void the election, and reimplement military rule. On the other hand, we believe there are those who are committed to returning to the barracks and believe that the military can begin improving its military capabilities only when it steps away from direct political activity. [redacted]

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The Doe Factor. Attitudes toward the return to civilian rule are complicated by divided opinion over what role, if any, Doe should play in

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[REDACTED]

the new government. Although Doe is the odds-on favorite to win the presidential election, his candidacy will continue to foster considerable debate in the military. Doe's erratic behavior--including his proclivity for making spur of the moment decisions, lashing out at advisors, jailing critics, and provoking confrontations with the US--has raised doubts among some military personnel of all ranks about his fitness to retain office. Many apparently fear that Doe could jeopardize US military and economic aid that Liberia needs to survive. Others, regardless of their misgivings over Doe's administrative incompetence, believe he is the only individual with the requisite "toughness" to ensure continued political stability.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Finally, Doe's candidacy runs the risk of worsening ethnic tensions in the military. Non-Krahns worry that Krahn domination will increase if Doe is elected Liberia's civilian president.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] On the other hand, Krahns and other tribes from southeastern Liberia that have particularly benefited from Doe's rule fear that their political and economic circumstances will worsen if Doe does not become civilian president.

[REDACTED]

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Outlook and Implications for the United States

Liberia's political climate during the 18 month transition is likely to remain uncertain and subject to sudden change. In our view, Doe will have difficulty balancing the conflicting expectations and demands within the military and will remain vulnerable to a coup by frustrated soldiers throughout the transition. In particular, Doe will find it difficult to balance pressures to maintain and even increase benefits for the military with pressure from US and international lenders that the government exercise greater fiscal austerity. Paradoxically, if Doe repeats the nationalistic posturing of last spring in hopes of extracting more US aid, he risks antagonizing those military officers who counsel against straining relations with Washington. (See Table 4)

[REDACTED]

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Doe also will be closely watched for his handling of the ethnic factor. Continued recruitment of Krahns into the Army almost certainly will further offend non-Krahns who already believe Doe's cronies are preparing for civilian rule by grabbing the choicest assignments. For their part, Krahns may become increasingly intolerant of opposition

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politicians and any campaign rhetoric they believe threatens Doe's electoral prospects. [REDACTED]

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We also believe senior officers will pay close heed to how open an election campaign Doe permits. In our judgment, Doe could provoke serious unrest if he gives the appearance of being too blatant in his attempts to rig the elections. In particular, Doe's [REDACTED] manipulating election laws to disqualify candidates and parties for ideological reasons may not sit well with senior officers concerned about Liberia's international image. [REDACTED]

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Although impossible to predict with certainty, in our estimation, three basic scenarios are most probable: a grudging toleration of the status quo by the military, a takeover by senior officers, or a coup by junior officers or enlisted men. [REDACTED]

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More of the Same--Muddling Through. Under this scenario--which we believe most likely at present--armed forces' "professionals" who prefer to remain aloof from politics would carry the day. Although displeased with some aspects of Doe's rule, most uniformed personnel would give grudging support to Doe. This scenario, however, requires that Doe be responsive to the needs of the military and seek the safest and least divisive route through the thicket of conflicting political, economic, and military demands that he will face during the coming months. Doe would need to offset potentially unpopular moves intended to advance his own candidacy--such as muzzling the press and selectively harassing rivals and critics--with "presidential" gestures of forceful leadership and magnanimity. In any event, Doe is unlikely to make significant headway in dealing with more fundamental issues such as carrying out structural economic reforms, curbing corruption, and improving government management. [REDACTED]

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A Palace Coup. We believe that over time Doe's senior military and civilian advisors could come to believe that political stability and a restoration of Liberia's international image requires Doe's removal. Such a palace coup could involve Doe's quiet but forceful ouster by senior officers, his assassination--perhaps by one or more disgruntled former military council members, or a more widespread and bloody takeover. [REDACTED]

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The stability of such a regime would depend in large measure on the ethnic composition of the new government and the response of Krahn enlisted men, the majority of whom support Doe and have benefitted by his regime. Over the short run, however, we believe senior officers, who reportedly enjoy respect for their professionalism among the rank and file, could rally enough support to restore order and establish an interim government. These officers would have little choice but to turn to

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civilian experts to keep the government functioning and to plead for US understanding and increased aid. [REDACTED]

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We hold out little hope, however, that senior officers would prove significantly more adept than their predecessors in implementing longer term economic reforms or developing stable political institutions. While remaining committed to a return to civilian rule, the process most likely would be delayed as senior officers attempted to solidify their control. [REDACTED]

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We cannot discount a bloody coup by unknown junior officers or enlisted men modelled along the precedent set by Doe. Tribal animosities and weakened military discipline could usher in prolonged instability as junior officers and enlisted men with little experience grapple to consolidate their position and to find additional sources of external aid. The new government probably would prove difficult for the West to deal with and could threaten US [REDACTED] facilities in Liberia in hopes of getting more aid from Washington. Foreign investors, already worried about the risk of doing business in Liberia, would be further unnerved and capital flight would be likely to ensue. The uncertainties in this situation would offer Moscow and Tripoli at least short-term opportunities to meddle at US expense. [REDACTED]

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The United States' close and extensive ties to Liberia are well documented. This "special relationship" makes it inevitable that Washington will be centrally involved in whatever scenario emerges. However, the widely shared pro-American sentiments of most of Liberia's military officials must be balanced against the widespread and currently fashionable prickliness over Liberia's domestic sovereignty. As such, the US is likely to be placed in a delicate position that will make any Washington-inspired initiatives sensitive and difficult. [REDACTED]

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Warning Signs

As uncertain and volatile as Liberian politics is likely to be during the next 18 months, we believe certain events or policies bear particularly close watching and could serve as signals of more significant changes ahead. In particular, we will be paying close attention for signs that:

- Doe's behavior is becoming so erratic and heavy handed that it is alienating senior officers once loyal to the president;
- soldiers are becoming increasingly worried that a new civilian government will be less benevolent and less concerned with their economic well being, or that they have not yet had their share of the spoils;

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- growing numbers of soldiers are expressing the belief that the election is primarily a tribal concern and that it will either perpetuate or end Krahn domination, or bring leftists to power;

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- economic hard times are making living conditions for soldiers and their families even more precarious, and fueling perceptions that Doe has forgotten the "little man".

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TABLE 1. Liberian Military Units

<u>Unit and Location</u>	<u>Personnel Strength*</u>				<u>Comment</u>
	<u>Wish</u> <u>List</u>	<u>MOD</u> <u>Est.</u>	<u>Officers</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Ranks</u> <u>1983</u>	
<u>AFL Headquarters</u> Monrovia	225	300	111	185	Commanded by Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Henry Dubar, a Krahn. Other senior Armed Forces of Liberia staff officers include: Major General Kpenkpah Y. Konah, Deputy Chief of Staff; Brigadier General Moses K. Craig, Director of Staff; Commanding General Morris T. Zaza; Colonel Stephen Blayee, Assistant Minister of Defense for Civil Works; Captain Anthony P. Togba, Deputy Minister of Defense for Administration; Captain S. Weaka Peters, Assistant Minister of Defense for Coast Guard Affairs; Colonel Thomas Gaye, G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff; Colonel Jackson J. Payne, Deputy Minister of Defense for Operations; Colonel Tommy Raynes, Assistant Minister of Defense for Public Affairs
<u>Liberian National</u> <u>Coast Guard</u> Monrovia, Buchanan, and Greenville	406	443	41	402	Commanded by Commandant Patrick Gba Doe Wallace, a Grebo. Majority are Kru; has only one Krahn. One of Armed Forces of Liberia's most efficient and disciplined units. Its 7 patrol craft are not sufficient for mission of protecting territorial waters.

*First column refers to government's 1984 "wish list" of preferred unit strengths. Second column is based upon estimates made by the Ministry of Defense in March 1984. Third and fourth columns are estimates made in October 1983 by the Armed Forces of Liberia of officers and enlisted personnel, respectively.

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<u>Unit and Location</u>	<u>Personnel Strength</u>				<u>Comment</u>
	<u>Wish List</u>	<u>MOD Est.</u>	<u>Officers 1983</u>	<u>Other Ranks 1983</u>	
<u>Air Reconnaissance Unit</u> Monrovia Camp Ramrod Springs Payne Airfield	137	56	14	32	Commanded by Colonel S. Augustus Jarba, who allegedly uses unit's aircraft for private gain. Most leaders are Krahn and Kru. One of Armed Forces of Liberia's most capable units, but not all of its 10 light aircraft, mostly Cessnas, are operational and are insufficient support for the Coast Guard.
<u>Engineer Battalion</u> Camp Jackson, Bong County	391	421	54	371	Commanded by Colonel Stephen J. Blayee, a Krahn. Military and civilian construction projects are hampered by lack of spare parts.
<u>Tubman Military Academy</u> Camp Todee	258	291	62	219	Commanded by Colonel Maxwell Weah, tribal affiliation unknown. Ministry of Defense provides little support. Commander feeds trainees out of his own salary. New recruits are almost all Krahns, semiliterate.
<u>AFL Brigade Headquarters</u> Monrovia, Barclay Training Center	143	274	63	200	Commanded by Colonel Alfred Menyeah, tribal affiliation unknown.
<u>Brigade Special Unit</u> Monrovia, Barclay Training Center	129	118	11	112	Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Largo, tribal affiliation unknown.

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<u>Unit and Location</u>	<u>Personnel Strength</u>				<u>Comment</u>
	<u>Wish</u> <u>List</u>	<u>MOD</u> <u>Est.</u>	<u>Officers</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Ranks</u> <u>1983</u>	
<u>Logistics Command</u> Monrovia, Barclay Training Center	310	348	65	253	Commanded by Colonel John G. Nuah, tribal affiliation unknown. Inordinate paperwork and low number of people makes unit ineffective.
<u>Military Police</u> <u>Company</u> Monrovia, Barclay Training Center	129	321	18	317	Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Bengue, tribal affiliation unknown.
<u>Woman's Army</u> <u>Corps Unit</u> Monrovia, Barclay Training Center	129	101	20	122	Commanded by Major Delisha W. Tugba, tribal affiliation unknown. No WACs have received basic training.
<u>Armored Scout</u> <u>Unit</u> Monrovia, Camp Ramrod	220	71	11	63	Commanded by Captain Joseph D. Jarlee, a Krahn. Also known as 72nd Battalion. Many members are detailed to Executive Mansion Guard. Thirty soldiers were trained in Switzerland. <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 200px; height: 20px; margin: 5px 0;"></div> Has 12 Mowag armored vehicles, 8 operational. Not permitted 50 caliber ammunition.
<u>Signal Company</u> Monrovia, Ministry of Defense	129	53	8	44	Commanded by Major Joebious Dickson, tribal affiliation unknown.
<u>Infantry</u> <u>Battalions-5</u>	2940	-	-	-	

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<u>Unit and Location</u>	<u>Personnel Strength</u>				<u>Comment</u>
	<u>Wish</u> <u>List</u>	<u>MOD</u> <u>Est.</u>	<u>Officers</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Ranks</u> <u>1983</u>	
<u>1st Infantry</u> <u>Battalion</u> Camp Schiefflin, Marshall Territory	-	356	36	273	Commanded by Colonel Moses Wright, a Krahn. Generally lacks training and equipment, but has had training in crowd control. <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 300px; margin: 5px 0;"></div> Has many Loma officers, many Krahn and Kru; Wright is Doe's brother-in-law.
<u>2nd Infantry</u> <u>Battalion</u> Camp Todee	-	197	27	171	Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry M. Worlobah, tribal affiliation unknown. Reportedly will respond to any political campaign violence in Monrovia. Has had training in crowd control, well organized and disciplined, but no one guards ammunition, and unit lacks water supply and medical facilities.
<u>4th Infantry</u> <u>Battalion</u> Camp Whisnaut, Zwedru, Cape Palmas, and Greenville	-	204	27	143	Commanded by Colonel Arthur B. Joloka, a Krahn. Isolated border patrol unit; understrength, poorly equipped, ammunition is stored in a soldier's closet.
<u>5th Infantry</u> <u>Battalion</u> Camp Tubman, Gbarnga, Zwedru, Voinjama	-	610	76	627	Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Tweh, tribal affiliation unknown. Isolated border patrol unit.

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<u>Unit and Location</u>	<u>Personnel Strength</u>				<u>Comment</u>
	<u>Wish List</u>	<u>MOD Est.</u>	<u>Officers 1983</u>	<u>Other Ranks 1983</u>	
<u>6th Infantry Battalion</u> Camp Jackson Bomi Hills	-	259	30	199	Commanded by Colonel Edward Smith, a Krahn. Has inoperable weapons, little ammunition; minimal transportation, yet may be Armed Forces of Liberia's best unit. Has Krahn, Kru, and Grebo officers; all ethnic groups are represented in enlisted ranks. Has had training in crowd control; responsible for security along Sierra Leone border and defense of Monrovia.
<u>Field Artillery Battalion</u> Tolbert Farm	179	126	21	97	Commanded by Major David Zaza, tribal affiliation unknown. Has 105mm towed howitzer, 50 caliber machine guns, M40 106 recoilless rifles, but none have been fired since 1980. Unit is understrength and does not receive spare parts or maintenance support.
<u>Agricultural Battalion</u> Camp Todee	600	120	27	136	Commanded by Colonel Alfred Suah, tribal affiliation unknown. No effective leadership, no equipment, inactive.
<u>Headquarters, 3rd Support Battalion</u> Monrovia, Barclay Training Center	200	386	74	280	Commanded by Colonel Randolph B. Gaye, a Krahn. Provides bodyguards and drivers to senior governmental and military officials. Bondiway detachment has no mission--Firestone provides its own security. B Company in Kakata has no communications equipment, no vehicles, and

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<u>Unit and Location</u>	<u>Personnel Strength</u>				<u>Comment</u>
	<u>Wish</u> <u>List</u>	<u>MOD</u> <u>Est.</u>	<u>Officers</u> <u>1983</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Ranks</u> <u>1983</u>	
<u>Executive Mansion</u> <u>Guard</u> Tuzon, Zwedru in Grand Gedeh, Monrovia	522	674	95	660	Commanded by Brigadier General Emmanuel Sayon, a Krahn. Has sufficient weapons for everyone in its 4 companies; carries Romanian AKM assault rifles; Doe recently inducted 250-280 more Krahns for the unit. Other strength estimates reach 1300. Also performs intelligence functions for Doe; approximately 400 new recruits will guard Doe's mansion in Tuzon.
<u>Belle Yellah</u> <u>Special Detachment</u> Camp Belle Yellah	-	27	3	25	Commanded by Captain Joseph D. Kartuah, tribal affiliation unknown. Prison facility.
<u>Service Support</u> <u>Battalion</u>	-	510	68	280	Commanded by Colonel Raymond B. Outland, tribal affiliation unknown. Most of its new recruits have been for military bands.
<u>Brigade</u> <u>Intelligence</u> Security Agency	-	-	2	50	
TOTAL	7047	6294	991	5260	

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Table 2: Ethnicity and the Liberian Military

		<u>Pre-Doe Era</u>		<u>The Doe Regime</u>	
	Percent of Population of 2.2 million	Percent of Indigenous Officers, 1975*	Percent of Indigenous Enlisted men, 1975	Percent of ruling military council, 1984	Percent of Cabinet, 1984
Mande-speaking Tribes of northwestern Liberia					
Gbandi	3	-	-	-	-
Gio	9	-	-	14	16
Kpelle	20	8	15	11	-
Loma	6	16	60	11	11
Mandingo	4	-	-	-	5
Mano	7	-	-	11	-
Vai	3	-	-	-	5
Kru-speaking Tribes of southeastern Liberia					
Bassa	14	14	-	-	-
Grebo	8	12	-	9	11
Krahn	5	13	-	27	21
Kru	8	24	17	18	16
West Atlantic Tribes					
Gola	5	8	-	-	-
Kissi	3	-	-	-	-
Other Tribes	2	5	8	-	-
Americo-Liberians	3	-	-	-	16

*No reliable service-wide survey of the military's ethnic composition has been made since 1975. Inflation of personnel rosters to facilitate payroll skimming by officers makes Doe-era statistics suspect.

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Table 4: US Interests in Liberia


The US has extensive interests in Liberia, particularly   military access rights that would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere in Africa. Replacement costs for what is the largest concentration of US government assets in Africa would exceed \$100 million.

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Facilities and Access Agreements

Use



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Voice of America Transmitters and Relay Station

Broadcasts to Africa, the Middle East, parts of southwest Asia.


Access Agreements for Robertsfield International Airport and Port of Monrovia

Only ones in West Africa; rent-free; useful for rapid staging of US forces into Africa and the Persian Gulf during military emergencies.

The \$300 million American private investment in Liberia represents the second largest US investment in black Africa after Nigeria. This investment includes Firestone and Uniroyal rubber plantations, the LAMCO iron ore mine, in which Bethlehem Steel has a 25 percent interest, and affiliates of Chase Manhattan and Citibank. Some 75 percent of US-owned shipping is under Liberian flag-of-convenience registry, the world's largest.

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Population Density and Ethnic Composition of Liberia



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Subject: LIBERIA: CRITICAL TIMES FOR THE MILITARY [REDACTED]

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2 -- ALA/AF/W
4 -- ALA/AF/W [REDACTED]

25X1

ALA/AF/W: [REDACTED] (10 Aug 84)

25X1

S E C R E T